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Abstract. In this work, we introduce a new, efficient and practical
scheme based on the Rabin cryptosystem without using the Jacobi sym-
bol, message redundancy technique or the needs of extra bits in order
to specify the correct plaintext. Our system involves only a single prime
number as the decryption key and does only one modular exponentia-
tion. Consequently, this will practically reduce the computational efforts
during decryption process. We demonstrate that the decryption is unique
and proven to be equivalent to factoring.The scheme is performs better
when compared to a number of Rabin cryptosystem variants.
Keywords: Rabin Cryptosystem, Factoring, Coppersmiths Theorem, Chinese
Remainder Theorem.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Prior to 1970s, encryption and decryption were done only in symmetrical ways.
This was the practice until the advent of public key cryptosystem that was
introduced by [30]. Yet, at that time the notion of asymmetric cryptosystem
is somehow not well realized by many people. In 1978 the RSA cryptosystem
[24] went public and it is regarded now by the cryptographic community as the
first practical realization of the public key cryptosystem. The security of RSA
is based on the intractability to solve the modular e-th root problem coupled
with the integer factorization problem (IFP) of the form N = pq. In 1979, one
year after the invention of RSA cryptosystem, Michael O. Rabin [20] introduced
another cryptosystem which was based on the intractability to solve the square
root modulo problem of a composite integer. In fact, this cryptosystem is the
first public key system of its kind that was proved equivalent to factoring N =
pq. At first glance, we might consider Rabin cryptosystem as an RSA variant
with the use of the public exponent e = 2 differing from RSA which utilizes
public exponents e ≥ 3. Interestingly, this claim is not necessarily true since
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by definition gcd(e, φ(N)) = 1 for RSA, but gcd(e = 2, φ(N)) 6= 1 in the case
of Rabins exponent, where φ(N) = (p − 1)(q − 1). In addition, the role of the
public exponent e = 2 of Rabin encryption gives a computational advantage over
the RSA. In [20], the encryption is computed by performing a single squaring
modulo N . This is far more efficient by comparison to the RSA encryption, which
requires the calculation of at least a cubic modulo N [3]. Based on recent results
in this area the public exponent for RSA must be sufficiently large. Values such
as e = 3 (the smallest possible encryption exponent for RSA) and e = 17 can no
longer be recommended, but commonly used values such as e = 216+1 = 65537
still serve to be fine, thus Rabin has some advantage regarding to this matter [1].
On the other hand, Rabin decryption breaks up into two parts. Firstly are the
calculation of two modular exponentiations, and then the computation using
Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) is used. Here the efficiency of the Rabin
decryption is slightly faster than to RSA.
The Rabin encryption function in the form c = m2 (mod N), where N = pq
such that p, q are primes congruence 3 (mod 4) is considered to be as hard as
factoring problem. In other words, it is mathematically proven that a random
plaintext can be recovered completely from the ciphertext, if and only if the
adversary is able to efficiently factoring the public key N = pq. On the contrary,
the RSA encryption in the form c = me (mod N) might be easier than factoring
problem. This is the case because the equivalent of RSA encryption function
vis-a-vis factoring is not yet proven. Therefore the process of finding the e-th
root is maybe possible without the need of factoring N = pq. The security of
the RSA encryption scheme is based on the assumption that modular e-th root
problem is a one-way function and yet the only methods to find the e-th root
might be only if the adversary is capable to efficiently factoring the public key
N = pq.
In principle, the Rabin scheme is really efficient, because only a square is
required for encryption; furthermore, it is shown to be as hard as factoring
problem. Alas, the Rabin cryptosystem suffer from two major drawbacks; the
foremost one is because the Rabins decryption produces four possible candidates,
thus introduces ambiguity or unclearness to decide the correct message out of
four possible values. Another drawback is from the fact that its equivalence
relation to factorization. On one side, the Rabin cryptosystem gives confidence
as the security of breaking such system is proven to be as difficult as factoring
compare to RSA. On the other side, the computational equivalence relation of
the Rabin cryptosystem and the integer factorization problem makes the scheme
vulnerable to an adversary that can launch a stronger attack, namely the chosen
ciphertext attack. In summation, any scheme that inherits the properties of a
security reduction that is equivalent to factoring is not very practicable as cipher
systems [26]. These two disadvantages of the Rabin encryption scheme prevented
it from widespread practical use.
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1.2 Related work
In spite of the situation of four-to-one mapping of Rabins decryption, and the
vulnerability to chosen ciphertext attacks, several attempts were made to solve
this problem adequately. It is very interesting to witness continuous efforts in
searching for apractical and optimal Rabin cryptosystem by numerous scholars.
We put forward the summary for Rabins variants as follows.
Williams [11] proposed an implementation of the Rabin cryptosystem us-
ing the Jacobi symbol. Williams solves for unique decryption while maintaining
the property of Rabins scheme, i.e. breaking is equivalence to factoring. Sub-
sequently, the utility of the Jacobi symbol as extra information to define the
correct square root accompanied with Rabin cryptosystem was also proposed
by [13]. Nonetheless, both encrypt-decrypt processes require the Jacobi symbol
calculation.This consequence in turn goes to additional computational cost and
the extra bits lead to ciphertext overhead.Next is the extra bits methodology.
It is a very attractive approach to solve the uniqueness problem in the Rabin
decryption procedure. It appeared in current literature such as extra bits intro-
duced by [18] and also utilized together with the Dedikind Sums Theorem in
[7].
In [3] a redundancy to the message was proposed, which intends to append
the plaintext with the repeating of least significant bits of the message with a pre-
defined length. This approach will likely provide the decryption with a unique
output but has a small probability that decryption may fail. In [19, 29] and
[15] the authors proposed a Rabin-type cryptosystem with alternative modulus
choice of N = p2q. Such moduli is claimed to be no easier as to factoring the
conventional modulus of N = pq [10]. The combination of Rabin cryptosystem
with a specific padding method was proposed by [14], [19] by using Optimal
Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [17] and Rabin-SAEP [5]. Note that
the message output by decryption process for this padding scheme is unique but
the decryption may fail with small probability.
1.3 Motivation and Contributions
It is of practical considerations that motivated researchers to turn the Rabin
scheme to be useful and practical as RSA since it possess practical qualities. In
general, all the existing variation seems to apply some additional features, for
instance; implementing some padding, adding redundancy in the message or ma-
nipulate some mathematical pattern, with the target to get a unique decryption
result but at the same time losing its computational advantage over RSA. In
order to engage this problem and to overcome all the mentioned shortcomings,
further analytical work is needed to refine those existing work.
In this work, we revisit Rabin cryptosystem and propose anew efficient and
practical scheme which has the following characteristics;
1. a cryptosystem that can be proven equivalent to factoring,
2. preserve the performance of Rabin encryption while producing a unique mes-
sage after decryption,
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3. improve decryption efficiency by using only one modular exponentiation as
oppose to typical Rabin-based decryption that use two one modular expo-
nentiation,
4. the decryption key using only a single prime number instead of two,
5. and finally, resilient to a side channel attack namely the Novaks attack by
avoiding the need for CRT computation.
1.4 Paper Organization
Section 2 provides a list of drawbacks from previous strategies that need to
be avoided for practically implementing the Rabin encryption scheme. In this
section we also highlight the methodology of the research performed.In section
3, we describe our proposal, and attach to it with a numerical example. This is
followed by rigorous analysis and discussion upon the security of the scheme, in
Section 4. The conclusion appears in the final section.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Drawbacks of Previous Strategies
In this section, we initiate a list that describes the drawback of the previous
strategies to overcome the Rabin weaknesses. Hence we established conditions
that need to be avoided on any attempt to refine the Rabin scheme.
The Use of Jacobi Symbol The necessity to compute Jacobi symbol possi-
bly during the key generation, encryption or decryption makes the scheme less
efficient [5]. In terms of computational performance, basically Rabin encryption
is extremely fast as long as this process does not require for computing a Jacobi
symbol [25].
Message Redundancy and Padding Mechanism Some schemes introduce
redundancy upon the message or design padding mechanism aiming to achieve an
efficient way to determine the correct plaintext from its four possible candidates.
For instance, as for HIME(R) cryptosystem that applies OAEP and Rabin-SAEP
with a padding mechanism that designated to be simpler than OAEP. However,
both methods still have a probability of decryption failure even though small.
The Use of CRT We observe that Rabins entire variant involves the process
of finding all the four square roots modulo a composite number.Such procedure,
utilizes the CRT, hence the power analysis, side channel attack (see [23]) is
applicable on such computation.
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2.2 Methodology
Now, we outlined the methodology to overcome the drawbacks of the Rabin
cryptosystem and all its variants. Firstly, we put the condition on the modulus
of type N = p2q to be used. We then impose restriction on the plaintext m and
ciphertext c space as m ∈ Zp2 and c ∈ Zp2q, respectively. From the plaintext-
ciphertext expansion such restriction leads to a system that is not a length-
preserving for the message.
Let m and c be the plaintext and ciphertext and c(m) be the function of c
taking m as its input. Say, for instance, in RSA the plaintext and ciphertext
spaces are the same, thus we denote the mapping as c(m) : Zpq −→ Zpq. Note
that this situation could be an advantage for the RSA scheme since RSA encryp-
tion has no message expansion. This is not, however true for all cryptosystems.
For example, the plaintext-ciphertext mapping for Okamoto-Uchiyama Cryp-
tosystem [28] is c(m) : Zp −→ Zp2 , Pailier cryptosystem [22] and the scheme by
[8] is c(m) : Zpq −→ Z(pq)2 , Rabin-SAEP [5] mapping is c(m) : Z pq
2
−→ Zpq and
Schmidt-Samoa cryptosystem [15] is c(m) : Zpq −→ Zp2q.
The maximum space size is determined by the plaintext space. One way to
do it would be to tell the user a maximum number of bits for the plaintext
messages. If we view the message as merely the keys for a symmetric encryption
scheme, meaning that the message is indeed a short message, then this is fine
as many others schemes also implement this approach. Thus, we argue that the
restriction of message space would be a hindrance is not an issue.
3 Our Proposed Scheme: The Rabin-p Cryptosystem
In this section, we provide the details of the proposed cryptosystem namely
Rabin-p Cryptosystem. Rabin-p is named after the Rabin cryptosystem with
the additional p symbolizing that the proposed scheme only uses a single prime
p as the decryption key. The proposed cryptosystem defined as follows.
Algorithm 1. Key Generation
INPUT: The size k of the security parameter.
OUTPUT: The public key N = p2q and the private key p.
1. Generate two random and distinct primes p and q
satisfying p ≡ 3 (mod 4) and q ≡ 3 (mod 4)
2. Compute N = p2q.
3. Return the public key N and the private key p.
Algorithm 2. Encryption
INPUT: The plaintext m and the public key N .
OUTPUT: A ciphertext c.
1. Choose plaintext m < 22k−1 such that gcd(m,N) = 1.
2. Compute c ≡ m2 (mod N).
3. Return the ciphertext c.
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Remark 1. We observe that the message space is restricted to the range m <
22k−1. It shows that the message m < 22k−1 = 2
2k
2 <
p2
2 < p
2.
Algorithm 3. Decryption
INPUT: A ciphertext c and the private key p.
OUTPUT: The plaintext m
1. Compute w ≡ c (mod p).
2. Compute mp ≡ w
p+1
4 (mod p).
3. Compute i =
c−mp
2
p .
4. Compute j ≡ i2mp (mod p).
5. Compute m1 = mp + jp.
6. If m1 <
p2
2 , then return m = m1.
7. Else return m = p2 −m1.
Remark 2. The decryption algorithm needs only a single prime number as its
key and it operates with single modular exponentiation operation. This situa-
tion would give impact on the overall computational advantage of the proposed
scheme against other Rabin variants.
3.1 Proof of Correctness
Suppose c ≡ m2 (mod p2q) then c−m2 ≡ 0 (mod p2q). Note that, if c−m2 is
divisible by p2q then it is certainly divisible by p2. From Remark 1 the message
m < 22k−1 = 2
2k
2 <
p2
2 < p
2. Thus, it is sufficient to solve for c ≡ m2 (mod p2)
as stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let c ≡ m2 (mod p2) then there exist two distinct square roots of c;
i.e. m1 and m2 such that m1 6= m2 and m1
2 ≡ m2
2 ≡ c (mod p2).
Proof. Suppose m1 6= m2 such that m1
2 ≡ m2
2 ≡ c (mod p2). Then
m1
2 −m2
2 ≡ (m1 +m2)(m1 −m2) ≡ 0 (mod p
2) (1)
Note that p2|(m1+m2)(m1−m2), thus consider p|(m1+m2)(m1−m2) as well.
If p|(m1+m2) and p|(m1−m2), then p would divide (m1+m2)+(m1−m2) = 2m1
and (m1 +m2)− (m1 −m2) = 2m2. Since p ≡ 3 (mod 4) is an odd prime, then
p ∤ 2 so p would divide both m1 and m2. Consider m1
2 ≡ c (mod p2) thus
m1
2 = c+ lp2 for some integer l. If p|m1 then p|m1
2 therefore p|c. Observe that
gcd(c, p) = 1 therefore p ∤ c. Hence p ∤ m1. The same goes for p ∤ m2.
Now, consider in the case if p|(m1 +m2) or p|(m1−m2) but not both. Since
p2|(m1 +m2)(m1 −m2), therefore either p
2|(m1 + m2) or p
2|(m1 −m2). This
concludes m1 ≡ m2 (mod p
2) and m1 ≡ −m2 (mod p
2). ⊓⊔
Theorem 1. If m < 22k−1 such that c ≡ m2 (mod N) , then the Algorithm 3
(Decryption) will output the unique m.
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Proof. From Lemma 1, there are two distinct solution for c ≡ m2 (mod N).
Now, we show that the decryption output by the Algorithm 3 is correct and
produces only a unique solution for m < 22k−1. We shall break down the proof
in two separate lemmas as follows.
Lemma 2 (Correctness). Suppose mp is a solution to w ≡ c (mod p). Let j
be a solution to 2mpj ≡ i (mod p) such that i =
c−mp
2
p . Then m = mp + jp is
a solution to c ≡ m2 (mod p2). Furthermore −m (mod p2) is another solution.
Proof. Suppose we are given the ciphertext c as described in the encryption
algorithm, and need to solve for its square root modulo N = p2q. Let c ≡ m2
(mod N), and since p|N , then we have w ≡ m2 ≡ c (mod p). From here, since
m < p2 thus it is sufficient just solving w ≡ c (mod p). We begin by solving
w ≡ c (mod p). Let mp is a solution to w ≡ c (mod p) such that w ≡ mp
2
(mod p). It thus suffices to find for mp the values m = mp+ jp for some integer
j that we will find later. Suppose that m = mp + jp is a solution for w ≡ c
(mod p), then we have
c ≡ m2 ≡ (mp + jp)
2 ≡ mp
2 + 2mpjp (mod p
2) (2)
So, the above congruence can be rearranged as 2mpjp ≡ c−mp
2 (mod p2).
Note that from w ≡ mp
2 (mod p), we have c−mp
2 ≡ 0 (mod p) which means
that c −mp
2 is a multiple of p, say ip for some integer i. From here, we could
simply compute i =
c−mp
2
p . We then rewrite this equation as
2mpjp ≡ ip (mod p
2) (3)
Hence, p factor immediately cancelled out from 2mpjp ≡ ip (mod p
2) since
it implies that 2mpj ≡ i (mod p). Hence, we compute j ≡
i
2mp
(mod p). To
conclude, we have a solution m = mp + jp for c ≡ m
2 (mod p2). Observe that
−m (mod p2) is also another solution. ⊓⊔
Corollary 1. Let m1 and m2 be the solution for c ≡ m
2 (mod p2) then m1 +
m2 = p
2.
Proof. Suppose ±m (mod p2) are the solution for c ≡ m2 (mod p2) as shown by
Lemma 2. Observe that if we set m1 ≡ m (mod p
2) then m2 ≡ −m (mod p
2).
Thus, m2 can be simply written as p
2 −m. Conclusively, m1 +m2 = p
2. ⊓⊔
Now, the following lemma shows that the decryption algorithm will output the
unique solution m.
Lemma 3 (Uniqueness). Let m < 22k−1. Then the decryption algorithm will
output the unique m.
Proof. Observe that the upper bound for m is 22k−1 − 1 < p
2
2 . Consider m1 +
m2 = p
2 with p2 is an odd integer. Then either m1 or m2 is less than
p2
2 that
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satisfies the upper bound of m < 22k−1. Observe that p2 is an odd integer, then
by definition p
2
2 is not an integer. Since that m1 and m2 need to be integers,
thus m1,m2 6=
p2
2 .
Suppose we consider both m1 and m2 are less
p2
2 , then we should have m1+
m2 < p
2 therefore we have a contradiction (i.e the fact that m1 +m2 = p
2). On
the other hand, if we consider both m1 and m2 are greater than
p2
2 , then we
should have m1+m2 > p
2 yet we reach the same contradictory statement.Thus,
one of m1 or m2 must be less than
p2
2 .
Suppose m1 <
p2
2 then there must exist a real number ǫ1 such that m1+ǫ1 =
p2
2 . On the other site, since we let m1 <
p2
2 , then m2 must be greater than
p2
2 .
Suppose m2 >
p2
2 then there must exist a real number ǫ2 such thatm2−ǫ2 =
p2
2 .
If we add up these two equations, we should have
(m1 + ǫ1) + (m2 − ǫ2) =
p2
2
+
p2
2
= p2 (4)
But since we have m1 + m2 = p
2, thus (ǫ1 − ǫ2) should be equal to zero,
meaning that ǫ1 = ǫ2. Finally, we conclude that only one of m1 or m2 are less
than p
2
2 and will be outputted by the decryption algorithm as the uniquem. ⊓⊔
4 Analysis and Discussion
4.1 Equivalent to Factoring N = p2q
If a new cryptosystem is designed then we are expected to provide a comparison
of the relative difficulty of breaking the scheme to the solving of any existing hard
problems. In this case is breaking the proposed scheme is reducible to factoring
the modulus N = p2q? We may put this as if there exists an algorithm to factor
the modulus N = p2q then there exists an algorithm to find the message m from
the ciphertext c output by the proposed scheme. The converse is also true, as
will be exemplified in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Breaking the Rabin-p cryptosystem scheme is equivalence to fac-
toring the modulus N = p2q.
Proof. We show the proof for both directions as follows.
(⇒) Breaking the Rabin-p cryptosystem is reducible to factoring N = p2q.
Suppose we have an algorithm with the ability to factor the modulus N =
p2q, then we can solve the message m from the ciphertext c output by the pro-
posed scheme simply by following the outlined decryption algorithm. Therefore
the proposed scheme is reducible to factoring.
(⇐) Factoring N = p2q is reducible to breaking the Rabin-p cryptosystem.
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Conversely, suppose there exists an algorithm that break the proposed
scheme; that is able to find the message m from the ciphertext c then there
exists an algorithm to solve the factorization of the modulus N = p2q. Implying
that someone who can decrypt the message m from the ciphertext c must also
be able to factor N = p2q. ⊓⊔
The factoring algorithm is defined as follows.
Algorithm 4. Factoring Algorithm
INPUT: A ciphertext c and the modulus N .
OUTPUT: The prime factors p2,q.
1. Choose an integer 22k−1 < mˆ < 22k − 1
2. Compute cˆ ≡ mˆ2 (mod N).
3. Ask the decryption of ciphertext cˆ
4. Receive the output m′ < 22k−1.
5. Compute gcd(mˆ±m′, N) = p2.
6. Compute Np2 = q.
7. Return the prime factors p2, q.
4.2 Coppersmith’s Theorem
Coppersmith [6] introduced a significantly powerful theorem for nding small
roots of modular polynomial equations using the LLL algorithm. In general,
finding solutions to modular equations is easy if we know the factorization of
the modulus. Else, it can be hard. When working with modulo a prime, there is
no reason to use Coppersmiths theorem since there exist far better root-finding
algorithm (i.e Newton method). Since then, this method has found many dif-
ferent applications in the area of public key cryptography. Interestingly, besides
many cryptanalytic results it has likewise been employed in the design of prov-
ably secure cryptosystems. The method has found many different applications
in the area of public key cryptography, for example, such as to factor N = pq
if the high bits of p are known, and attacking stereotyped messages in RSA by
sending messages to whose differences is less than N1/e. Now we provide the
Coppersmith’s theorem.
Theorem 3. [6] Let N be an integer of unknown factorization. Let fN (x) be a
univariate, a monic polynomial of degree δ. Then we can find all solutions x0
for the equation fN(x) ≡ 0 (mod N) with |x0| < N
1/δ in polynomial time.
Corollary 2. Let c ≡ m2 (mod N) from the ciphertext. If m < 23n/2 then m
can be found in polynomial time.
Proof. Suppose c ≡ m2 (mod N). Consider the univariate, monic polynomial
fN (x) ≡ x
2 − c ≡ 0 (mod N), hence δ = 2.Thus, by applying Theorem 3 the
root x0 = m can be recovered if m < N
1/δ = N1/2 ≈ 23n/2. Therefore, to avoid
this attack, we need to set m > 23n/2. ⊓⊔
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Theorem 4. [2] Let N be an integer of unknown factorization, which has a
divisor b > Nβ . Furthermore, let fb(x) be a univariate, a monic polynomial of
degree δ.Then we can find all solutions x0 for the equation fb(x) ≡ 0 (mod b)
with |x0| <
1
2N
β2/δ in polynomial time.
Corollary 3. Let c ≡ m2 (mod p2) such that p2 is an unknown factor for N .
If m < 22n/3 then m can be found in polynomial time.
Proof. Suppose c ≡ m2 (mod p2) such that p2 is an unknown factor for N .
Consider fp2(x) ≡ x
2 − c ≡ 0 (mod p2) with p2 ≈ N2/3 ≈ 22n. We can find a
solution x0 = m if m <
1
2N
β2/δ < N (2/3)
2/2 = N2/9 ≈ 22n/3. ⊓⊔
4.3 Chosen Ciphertext Attack
Notice that the factoring algorithm mentioned by the Algorithm 4 could provide
a way to launch a chosen ciphertext attack upon the proposed scheme in polyno-
mial time, hence resulting in the system totally insecure in this sense. Therefore,
in order to provide security against this kind of attack, we could consider imple-
menting any hybrid technique with symmetric encryption. The result from [9] is
suitable for our scheme in order to achieve chosen ciphertext security, with the
cost of a hash function. We may also apply the chosen ciphertext secure hybrid
encryption transformation that was proposed in [16].
4.4 Side Channel Attack
In general, the decryption algorithm of a Rabin based cryptosystem consists
of two parts where the first part is the modular exponentiation operation in
order to obtain the value of message modulo p and q from the ciphertext c. The
second part then would be the recombination process using the CRT to recover
the proper message m. Most side channel attacks deal with the first part. For
instance, using a timing attack approach [21, 31 and 4] or attacking by power
analysis approach [27]. Alternatively, Novak [23] proposed a side channel attack
on the second part (i.e. CRT computation). The result of Novaks attacks upon
the implementation of CRT shows that for a certain characteristic function can
be detected by power analysis.Hence the corresponding modulus can be factored
using such characteristic function. We reason that since our proposed scheme
does not need to carry out any CRT computation, thus the Novak attack is not
applicable on the Rabin-p cryptosystem.
4.5 Comparison
Table 1 illustrates a comparison between our proposed scheme and others Rabin
variants. Observe that only [20] and [29] suffers from the four to one decryp-
tion drawback situation. The works [13, 14 and 18] provide unique decryption
with the aid of extra bits; even so the adversary may obtain some advantage
since these additional bits may leak some useful information. In addition, these
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schemes also use the Jacobi symbol, which we already stressed out that such
implementation is indeed inefficient during encryption. Furthermore, the de-
cryption of the other Rabin variants that applies the message redundancy or
message padding methods (i.e. such as [3] or [5, 19], respectively) may fail with
a small probability.
We claim that our proposed scheme produces a unique decryption without
even using the Jacobi symbol, without sending extra bits of information, and
without using any redundancy or padding onto the message. Note that as far
as the Novak attacks on the computation of CRT is concerned; our proposed
scheme and the method described in [11] are not susceptible. Hence, these two
schemes are secure against the Novak attacks. For the computation of modu-
lar exponentiation, once again all the mentioned Rabin variants in this paper
perform two modular exponentiations, except for [11] and our scheme. Never-
theless, all the exponent of the size p, except of the size pq for [11], thus we gain
an advantage if compared to such scheme.
Table 1. Comparison between Our Proposed Scheme
and the Other Rabin Variants.
Scheme Unique De-
cryption
Jacobi Sym-
bol
Special
Message
Structure
Novak’s
attacks on
CRT
Modular
Exponen-
tiation in
Decryption
[20] No (4-to-1
mapping)
No No Yes 2
[11] Yes Yes Yes (Size Re-
striction)
No 1**
[13] Yes (With
extra bits)
Yes No Yes 2
[3] Yes* No Yes (Redun-
dancy)
Yes 2
[29] No (4-to-1
mapping)
No No Yes 2
[5] Yes* No Yes (Size
Restriction,
Padding)
Yes 2
[14] Yes (With
extra bits)
Yes Yes
(Padding)
Yes 2
[19] Yes* No Yes
(Padding)
Yes 2
[18] Yes (With
extra bits)
Yes (with
Dedikind
Sums)
No Yes 2
[7] Yes Yes No Yes 2
Our scheme Yes No Yes (Size Re-
striction)
No 1
* Decryption may fail with a small probability.
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** All the exponent of the size p, except of the size pq for [11].
5 Conclusion
Rabin-p cryptosystem is purposely designed without using the Jacobi symbol,
redundancy in the message and avoiding the demands of extra information for
finding the correct plaintext. Decryption outputs a unique plaintext without any
decryption failure. In addition, decryption only requires a single prime. Further-
more, the decryption procedure only computes a single modular exponentiation
instead of two modular exponentiation executed by other Rabin variants. As a
result, this reduces computational effort during decryption process. Some possi-
ble attacks such as Coppersmiths technique, chosen ciphertext attack and side
channel attack have been analyzed. Still, none can successfully affect the pro-
posed strategy. Finally, we show that Rabin-p cryptosystem is performs better
when compared to a number of Rabin variants.
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